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pessimism and optimism on this matter. The doctrines of original sin and 
total depravity don’t encourage a rosy outlook among those hoping that 
their proposed guidance for inquiry will result in actual improvements on 
a large scale. But the doctrines of divine grace and the indwelling of the 
Holy Spirit are more encouraging on this score. In any case, despite this 
concern (and with or without Christian teaching), it seems wise and val-
uable for epistemologists and others to try to do what we can to improve 
human inquiry (including our own) even if the prospects of widespread 
success often seem dim. In my view, Ballantyne has not only tried hard 
to do this, he has (in Knowing Our Limits) succeeded at providing us with 
usable advice that will improve our inquiry if only we can discipline (or 
otherwise arrange for) ourselves to follow it.
The Lost Sheep in Philosophy of Religion: New Perspectives on Disability,  Gender, 
Race, and Animals, edited by Blake Hereth and Kevin Timpe. Routledge, 
2020. Pp. xiii + 400. $155.00 (hardcover), $28.98 (e-book).
ANDREW W. ARLIG, Brooklyn College, CUNY
The Lost Sheep in Philosophy of Religion is a timely and significant contri-
bution to contemporary philosophy of religion. It is the product of a con-
certed effort to include more voices and perspectives and to expand the 
range of topics addressed by philosophers of religion, especially by those 
who practice it in Anglophone and thus primarily “analytic” departments 
of philosophy. Perhaps unsurprisingly, this volume includes a significant 
number of contributions by up-and-coming, early career philosophers, 
and hence, it also provides us with an exciting glimpse of the future of the 
philosophy of religion.
The volume consists of an introduction by the editors, followed by 
essays broken into five Sections. In the introduction, the editors helpfully 
survey analytic philosophy of religion as it is currently practiced as well 
as the main criticisms that have been launched against it both from within 
and from the outside. Section I is entitled “Methodology” and it consists 
of two pieces. The first is a fascinating summary and analysis of two focus 
group discussions organized and directed by Helen De Cruz (chapter 1), 
where she attempts to get a clearer picture of what it is like to be a member 
of an underrepresented group who is currently working in philosophy of 
religion. In the second contribution (chapter 2), Michelle Panchuk argues 
that philosophy of religion should dispense with the pretense that the 
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philosopher of religion ought to adopt an impersonal, objective standpoint 
with respect to her chosen subject of inquiry. First, as Panchuk argues, it 
is unclear whether there is such a standpoint. But more importantly, she 
forcefully (and, in this reviewer’s opinion, convincingly) argues that even 
if there were such a thing as a “God’s-eye perspective,” in many cases 
doing philosophy from such a position would be morally harmful. These 
essays make for riveting reading and together with the introduction they 
develop a compelling case for transforming philosophy of religion as it 
traditionally has been practiced. This part of Lost Sheep will also be a time 
capsule of sorts, providing for future historians an enduring snapshot of 
academic philosophy of religion at this crucial juncture in its evolution.
Section II consists of three essays dealing with broadly epistemological 
themes. Kirk Lougheed (chapter 3) considers the possibility that persons 
reporting religious experiences might on occasion be subject to various 
forms of epistemic injustice. Joshua Cockayne (chapter  4) provides an 
intriguing reflection on the way in which the sense of smell might pro-
vide a way to experience the presence of God, and thus to gain indi-
rect yet “non-metaphorical” understanding of the divine. And Joshua 
Blanchard (chapter 5) shows how certain cases of apparent “divine rever-
sals” in Scripture should call into question our confidence that “God is 
on our side.” Specifically, he leaves us with the important thought that 
there seems to be “a hierarchy of divine ethical concern” (132), such that 
acting with justice and compassion towards others is more central than 
enforcing certain behavioral norms or “cultic practices” (132). Therefore, 
“even if, in some ultimate sense, God wills a particular, narrow model of 
human gender or sexual life, it may be that, for the time being and even for 
quite a while, God not only permits but sanctifies alternative models that 
serve the underlying values at issue” (133). This lesson, he hastens to add, 
applies both to “conservatives” and to “liberals,” and thus his argument 
has potentially wide-ranging ramifications for theologically based ethics, 
both as it is debated by stakeholders and as it is applied by various reli-
gious communities.
Section III addresses several issues that directly pertain to non-human 
animals. In chapter 6, Dustin Crummett argues for a form of “animal uni-
versalism,” such that all animals with “interests” will eventually receive 
eternal, infinitely good afterlives. Faith Glavey Pawl (chapter 7) speculates 
about whether animals might have conscious awareness of divine pres-
ence, and she provides some reasons to think that if an animal has even 
a “limited Theory of Mind” (a concept she draws from psychology, and 
which has been applied in primate studies, for instance) and “an ability to 
detect other agents as individuals,” then it “might have some encounter 
with God where it senses God’s presence or action” (177). Finally, Blake 
Hereth (chapter 8) starts with the classical assumption that God is a maxi-
mally perfect being and argues for “zootheism,” that is, that “some divine 
person is an animal.”
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Section IV concerns disability. The first two essays by David Efird 
(chapter 9) and Kevin Timpe (chapter 10) offer reasons to think that at 
least some disabilities will persist in the afterlife. Efird argues that God 
has no reason either to eliminate or to retain physical disabilities, and 
hence, it would seem fitting that individuals will have the option to be 
resurrected with disabilities. Moreover, he argues, some individuals 
might have rational reasons to make that choice. Timpe argues that we 
have good reasons to think that among the heavenly goods are “beat-
ified disabilities,” that is, physical and cognitive disabilities that have 
been separated from the harms and badness that accompany them in the 
present life. In the final chapter in the section (chapter 11), Scott Williams 
examines a common contemporary notion of personhood, one which sees 
rationality as an essential constituent of personhood, and he argues that 
such a conception may lead to a form of ableism. Fortunately, he proceeds 
to argue, this contemporary notion of personhood is far from self-evi-
dent, and indeed, as he shows in a brief history of the concept, the con-
ception of a person as an essentially rational substance is a “theoretical 
posit” developed for other purposes than to serve as the locus of personal 
identity or moral worth.
Section V consists of five essays, each dealing with some aspect of 
sex, gender, or race. Eric Yang and Stephen Davis (chapter  12) start 
things off by considering two related questions. First, would it be mor-
ally impermissible for an incarnate God to take a spouse, have sexual 
relations, or procreate? Second, even if it were morally permissible, 
would it be “fitting” for an incarnate God to do so? Yang and Davis 
argue that while it would be morally permissible, there are compelling 
reasons to think that, all things considered (including and especially 
the actual historical realities of first-century Palestine), it would not be 
fitting for an incarnate God to be married or procreate. Kelli Potter then 
provides a “transfeminist” critique of several contemporary Mormon 
theologies of gender (chapter 13). Specifically, Potter argues that many 
interpretations of the famous Proclamation of 1995 as well as the cur-
rent official policies of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints 
lack solid theological footing but are instead grounded in patriarchal 
and heteronormative prejudices (320). Hilary Yancey (chapter 14) turns 
to the matter of whether bodies will be gendered in the afterlife. She 
argues that resurrection requires not only a new age of complete justice, 
but also “a final (and full) rectification of the injustice suffered in this 
life” (331). The only way to bring about this full, final rectification is for 
individuals to be resurrected with bodies that have gender. Therefore, 
in the life to come individuals will have gendered bodies. In chapter 15, 
David Worsley takes as his starting point a conception of limbo devel-
oped by Kevin Timpe in an earlier paper (“An Argument for Limbo,” 
Journal of Ethics 19 (2015): 277–292) and in a subtle display of analytical 
philosophical theology, he works out several surprising implications of 
this picture. Finally, Sameer Yadav (chapter 16) develops an ambitious 
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agenda for future research at the intersection of race theory and the 
philosophy of religion. He argues that while we have learned much 
in recent years about the complicated interplay between race and the 
history of Christianity and its effects on racial identity in the broader 
culture, many aspects of this story will remain underdetermined until 
we apply the methods and concepts of contemporary social ontology to 
the picture that is being developed. By applying the insights of current 
work by Brian Epstein and others on the metaphysics of social enti-
ties, philosophers reflecting on the intersection between race and reli-
gion will be in a position to diagnose and ameliorate certain features of 
Christian group identity that “anchor” contemporary racial identities 
and thereby perpetuate certain structural injustices.
Lost Sheep is a refreshing addition to the field. It succeeds at bring-
ing in a variety of new voices and perspectives—all the while, honestly 
acknowledging that it fails by other measures at achieving diversity (e.g. 
the essays all assume some form of theism and for the most part they 
work within a Christian framework)—and the contributors outline sev-
eral interesting and promising trajectories of future research. This, how-
ever, does not mean that more traditional concerns are discounted. Both 
the editors and many of the contributors assert that there is nothing wrong 
with discussions of, say, inquiries into the nature and attributes of God or 
questions about the rationality of believing in divinity and its nature. In 
fact, as many of these essays show, one can make exciting contributions 
to longstanding debates and concerns precisely by expanding the scope of 
philosophy of religion. For instance, as Crummett observes, the suffering 
of non-human animals highlights specific shortcomings with many of the 
standard answers given to the problem of evil (141). And both Cockayne’s 
reflection on the sense of smell and Pawl’s speculations about animal 
spirituality tie into larger concerns about how a transcendent being can 
be perceived or experienced in any respect by finite beings. While he does 
not note this, Cockayne’s essay also connects to current research on the 
contemplative, or “mystical,” literature, and specifically, to research that 
has pointed out what is arguably an overemphasis on the intellect and 
the consequent dismissal by many philosophers of embodied religious 
experiences (see, e.g., Christina Van Dyke, “What has History to do with 
Philosophy? Insights from the Medieval Contemplative Tradition,” in 
Philosophy and the Historical Perspective, edited by M. Van Ackeren (Oxford 
University Press, 2018), 155–170).
A number of the essays in this volume draw upon novel insights, con-
cepts, and methods developed and employed in other domains of ana-
lytic philosophy. As was already noted, Yadav refers to current work in 
the metaphysics of social entities. Yancey’s essay also addresses some of 
this literature, in particular, suggesting that certain irrealist metaphys-
ical accounts of gender are incompatible with what she has argued is 
the most probable picture of the afterlife that a committed Christian can 
have (337f). Many others make profitable use of the notion of epistemic 
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injustice, especially as it is formulated by Miranda Fricker in her seminal 
book (Epistemic Injustice (Oxford University Press, 2007)). Several of the 
essays, in fact, devote considerable space to canvassing these notions 
and summarizing the state of the art. Perhaps for some these surveys 
will seem to be unnecessarily didactic. But this reviewer sees their inclu-
sion, as well as the substantial bibliographical references, as a virtue of 
the volume. First, many of the book’s intended audience, that is, current 
analytic philosophers of religion, might not be conversant with these 
concepts or the corresponding literature. But second, and more impor-
tantly, these summaries of the state of the art make many of these pieces 
ideal for undergraduate teaching. As De Cruz reports, several of her 
focus group participants, despite wanting to do the right thing, found it 
difficult to be more inclusive in their pedagogy (40–41). Some of this was 
due to perceived expectations from students, but a large part of it had to 
do with the narrowness of most of the current anthologies and surveys. 
The appearance of this volume could begin to remedy this problem, as 
many of these articles would be excellent additions to an undergradu-
ate philosophy of religion syllabus. (This reviewer, for instance, will be 
trying out the papers by Cockayne, Crummett, Pawl, Efird, and Yancey 
in a current iteration of his undergraduate-level philosophy of religion 
course. Although, this by no means is meant to suggest that these are 
the only papers in the present volume that would be suitable for inclu-
sion in undergraduate courses.) For that matter, many of these articles 
could conceivably be included in other specialist courses (for instance, 
Yancey’s article in a metaphysics or philosophy of gender course as a 
litmus test for various accounts of the metaphysical status of gender) or 
even in a carefully crafted introduction to philosophy. The accessibility 
of the articles, however, does vary. Some are quite technical or assume a 
thorough familiarity with the relevant literature, enough so in fact that 
this reviewer would only countenance including them in more advanced 
undergraduate or graduate-level curricula. This, to be sure, is not a crit-
icism of Lost Sheep as such, as the volume was clearly not intended pri-
marily to be a textbook. Rather, as the editors insist, this volume aims 
to be only one modest contribution in a growing attempt to make the 
discipline of philosophy, and philosophy of religion, in particular, more 
diverse and inclusive, and thus more in step with the needs of pres-
ent-day students and future generations of philosophers. Measured in 
terms of that aim, the book is a resounding success.
Black Christology and the Quest for Authenticity: A  Philosophical Appraisal, 
by John H. McClendon III. Lexington Books, 2019. Pp. viii + 207. $95.00 
(hardcover).
SAMEER YADAV, Westmont College
Early in the introduction to Black Christology and the Quest for Authenticity, 
John McClendon III aptly observes: “Most works in mainstream philoso-
phy of religion simply ignore the important contributions of Black thinkers 
and scholars” (5). By and large, Christian philosophical theologians and 
atheologians alike—a good many of those who read Faith and Philosophy 
anyway—tend to ignore Black Theology (or feminist/womanist theology, 
or Latinx theology, etc.) as the proper object of their philosophical atten-
tion. These streams of Christian theology are often regarded as derivative 
and marginal—a theological sideshow of identity politics as distinct from 
the mainstream and more dominant Christian consensus of the Western 
Christian tradition. As a result, when philosophers consider the meaning 
or truth of some bit of Christian theological reasoning, what interests them 
is almost always the reasoning that figures within mainstream European 
and American Christianity, which also just so happens to be predominantly 
the theology of white European and American people, and not the many 
substantively developed theologies of non-white people. Nevertheless, 
the distinctive theology of black Christianity remains largely outside 
the purview of Anglo-American philosophical theology (and atheology) 
usually due to a skepticism about the merits of any theology uniquely 
qualified by social identity, even while the theology of white dominant 
Christianity retains the unqualified status of “just plain old theology.” For 
just this reason, there are very few scholarly works in the philosophy of 
religion or philosophical a/theology literature that so much as attempt to 
analyze or assess the theological claims of Black Theology. Perhaps the last 
significant work in that genre—William R. Jones’s Is God a White Racist? 
A Preamble to Black Theology (Beacon Press, 1973)—was published almost 
fifty years ago. This new work by John McClendon III therefore promises 
to address a glaring lacuna in the literature by offering (as the subtitle 
indicates) a “philosophical appraisal” of Black Christology, a central locus 
of constructive proposals in Black Theology.
McClendon observes that black theologians have variously sought to 
identify both Jesus and the God he incarnates as in some sense “black” 
in order to identify a form of “authentic” Christianity that is capable of 
siding with the black oppressed over the white oppressor—and hence 
an authentic Christianity that can be authentically embraced by black 
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